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1IN THE 
1 oF THE 
SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corpor.ation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT, 




STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
. Appellant has correctly characterized the case as being 
1 an action in unlawful detainer which seeks to recover 
possession from respondant of real property. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant has correctly stated that Judge Bryant H. 
Croft granted summary judgement, after hearing appel-
lant argue its case once in May, 1969, and then after 
deciding against appellant, hearing the appellant re-argue 
1 
its case once again in June and once again in Septa b • 
m each instance patiently considerinu and reconsi'd · ' o r,nno 
what appellant had to say, hut in e.ach instance failin: 
to find any basis whatsoever upon which to allow 
lant's case to continue. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant's version of the facts is so fraught with 
irrelevancies, omissions, inaccuries, and misleading in· 
ferences, that it seems best to competely restate the 
facts than to try to improve upon appellant's statement 
of them. 
Prior to June 1964, Ellis J. Robinson, and several 
corporations which he controlled became indebted to the 
respondant for large sums of money for services ren· 
dered over several years next prior hereto. The specific 
items of service were so numerous that at a certain point, 
when respondant's claim exceeded the obvious ability 
of Mr. Robinson to pay, respondant .and Mr. Robinson 
simply quit keeping track of the debt. 
Hanover Construction Comany was one of Robinson's 
companies, which on the first day of June 1964, conveyed 
several homes and lots in Oak Hills to Eliza S. Robinson, 
wife of Ellis J. Robinson. 
One of the lots conveyed to Mrs. Robinson by Han· 
l "H'' over Construction Co. was Lot 1 of Oak Hills, P at ' 
which respondant and his wife had an interest in acquir· 
ing. 
On Lot 1 was a beautiful, modern, new, brick veneer 
home. It had and has 3,134 square feet of finished living 
space, a double gar.age of 330 square feet, and porches, 
2 
patios and balconies of 234 square feet. The lot itself was 
an<l is 10,200 square feet. It is located in a neighorhood 
which has homes consistently selling for $65,000.00 to 
S95,000.00. Based on the minimum costs (then) of 
per square foot for living space and $2.50 square 
foot for garages, porches, etc., and the lot of 
SlS,000.00, the home had and has a value of at least 
S69,102.00. (3,134 X $17.00 plus 330 X $2.50, plus 
284 X $2.50, plus $15,000.00) These values are set forth 
I carefully in an affidavit on page 199 of the principal 
record, which appellant has not, cannot, and dare not 
rontrovert, without risking perjury. 
Doxey Layton Company is a mortgage company doing 
business in Salt Lake City, Utah 35 South 500 East . It 
had a prior construction mortgage on the subject property 
against which it had disbursed a total of $18,749.00 
(SS,000.00 plus $7,500.00, plus $4,875.00, plus $448.70, 
plus $700.00). 
l Because of minor prior disputes between Ellis J. 
I Robinson and Doxey Layton Company in other trans-
l actions, respondant had come to know Doxey Layton Co. 
1
1 When respondant expressed a tenative interest in the sub-
ject property, Doxey Layton promptly volunteered to 
make a $30,000.00 loan on the property if respondant 
would take it .as his own home. 
When Mr. Robinson said he would transfer title to 
the subject property for a credit on his debt, he said that 
he would probably accept Doxey Layton's appraisal as a 
basis for the credit. 
Mr. Melvin Teerlink, an appraiser for Doxey Layton, 
undertook the appraisal; and after due study, returned 
a written appraisal for $54,000.00 (The amount 1·8 rncn. 
tioned in Judge Croft's memorandum decision on 
208 of the record). The appraisal was low, but not 
low as it seemed in light of the fact that the basement had 
not then been finished (as it is now) (at a cost of oier 
$6,000.00) in rich hardwood panelling. 
Respondant and Ellis J. Robinson agreed that the 
property would be deeded to respondant in exchange for 
a credit of $54,000.00 minus the $18,749.00 construction 
mortgage and minus the approximately $1,850.00 in ac· 
crued interest thereon .and and minus a $9,000.00 second 
mortgage. Title was to respondant by Warranty 
Deed executed by Eliza S. Robinson on June 29, 1964 and 
recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on 
June 29th, 1964 in Book 2208 .at page 232. 
In November 1964 the new mortgage loan wai 
ready to close. No-one had even intimated that Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company was to be involved, either direct· 
ly or indirectly in the making of the loan. Negotiations 
were conducted entirely with the Doxey Layton Company. 
The closing was very straight forward and simple. 
With accruing interest, the pay-off on the construction 
mortgage was $20,685.23. There was a partial pay·off 
to Oak Hills on a second mortgage of $4,404.69, miscel· 
laneous recording and title costs of $107.25, and an 
escrow to insure the clearance of a mechanic's lien of 
$800.00, leaving $4,002.83 available funds out of the 
$30,000.00 lo.an. Respondant drew out $3,108.51 to pay 
part of the costs of finishing the basement and left 
$894.32 on hand with Doxey Layton to apply against 
future monthly installments to become due on the mo rt· 
gage. (See page 3 and 4 of the record on case # 174076 
on appeal in this court fo:r exact details). 
From the exhibits to case # 160928 which is also a 
I ' 
; part of the record in the appeal, it appears that Doxey 
i Layton secretly assigned their mortgage to Beneficial Life 
I inmrance Company on November 2nd, 1964, almost the 
I
I same date of the closing, but said nothing to respon<lant 
about the assignment, which indeed was unnecessary. 
Doxey Layton continued to service the mortgage, so 
that payments which fell due thereunder were made to 
I Doxey Layton Company, instead of the mortgagee's 
assignee, Beneficial Life Insurance Company, in spite of 
the assignment. 
Doxey Layton omitted one small detail, however. 
They forgot to send the payments respondant made to 
/ Doxey Layton Co. to Beneficial Life Insurance Company 
j l!'ith the consequence that although the mortgage was cur-
l rent in all respects, it showed delinquent on the books 
I of Beneficial Life Insurance Co. 
I 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company, through its new-
ly acquired attorney, was apparently not concerned 
about checking out basic facts before filing suits. He 
simply filed a complaint for foreclosure on the representa-
tions of Beneficial Life Insurance Company and without 
any prior notice to respondant as to his intentions. (See 
the file in case 160928 of the record on appeal in this 
case.) 
Upon receiving the summons and complaint, respond-
; ant went directly to Max Jenson, head of the mortgage 
, loan department at Beneficial Life Insurance Company, 
5 
and showed him undisputed evidence that the ""' .. u10hga•e 
w_as not in default in any way and asked him to 
lus alleged arrear.age from his aO'ent Doxey Layton c o ,om. 
pany and to tend to the prompt dismissal of the fore· 
closure complaint before more disastrous consequences 
attached to Beneficial's rather indiscriminate practice of 
filing fraudulent law suits. 
Doxey Layton Comp.any was in the process of convert-
ing its accounting system and it was virtually impossible 
at this time to find out anything from them about this 
or any other loan. Apparently Beneficial wasn't .able to 
get any satisfactory explanations from Doxey Layton, 
either, .and suggested that respondant pursue Doxey Lay· 
ton Co. for an accounting, which was attempted with the 
same result, namely no result at all. 
Since it appeared that Beneficial had made a rather 
regrettable but somewhat unintentional mistake and since 
some time would be required to pursue the Doxey Layton 
matter, and since, at that time, several pressures were 
mounting against respondant from other quarters, it 
seemed to respondant that the best solution would he 
to let Beneficial Life Insurance Company save face by 
a simple stipulated forclosure in exchange for a stip· 
ulated reinstatement privilege. 
hut would pursue that company in an independent claim. 
dant and his wife would give Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company a stipulated foreclosure in exchange for a stip· 
ulated reinstatement of the mortage at the end of the 
redemption period and upon tender of the back pay· 
ments. Respondant and his wife agreed that they would 
not claim anything against Beneficial for the unremitted 
and wrongfully withheld funds of Doxey Layton Co., 
6 
bnt would pursue that company in a independent claim. 
The stipulation was mostly oral, and left that way 
because it was none of the business of the other parties, 
11ho joined in the written portion of the stipulation, which 
is to be found on page 50 of Case #160928 which is part 
of the record on appeal in this case. 
The court entered a decree of foreclosure, the sher. 
riff sold the property, and at the end of the redemption 
period, respondants brought to Beneficial Life Insur-
ance Company the back payments with which to reinstate 
the mortage, all in pursuance of the .agreement between 
appellant and respondant. 
V'ffien the back payments were brought to Beneficial, 
however, a new face was encountered, that of one Eu-
gene Watkins. His comment on the until then smoothly 
running agreement was, '"We can't reinstate the mortage 
now. Interest rates have gone up." (As indeed they had) 
This breach of agreement coupled with the untoward 
personal conduct of Eugene Watkins (described in par-
agraph 3 7 on page 10 of the record in suit # 17 407 6) 
prornked the filing of a suit against appellants and its 
agents to perform the agreement to reinstate and to re-
cover damage for the attendant torts. 
Upon receiving copies of the summons and com-
plaint, Beneficial Life Insurance Company suddenly saw 
the light, and decided to reconsider its decision to breach 
the reinstatement agreement. They suddenly wanted to 
perform the reinstatement agreement if only the attend-
ant tort claims would be dismissed. 
In response to the persuasion of mutual friends, hut 
better judgement, respondant agreed 
to d1sm1ss the tort causes of action and release hi" 1 · c aim 
for damages in exchange for performance of the earlier 
agreement of Benenf icial Life Insur.ance Company to 
reinstate the mortgage. 
Respondant prepared the papers to reinstate the 
mortgage by simply setting aside the decree and sale in 
case No. 160209, but appellants seemed worried about 
proceeding this way. There were some junior lien claim. 
ants in case 160928 (Oak Hills, Tr:avis Wendelboe, and 
the United States of America) and Beneficial was worried 
that there might be some argument about the paramouncy 
of their lien if the foreclosure decree were simply va· 
cated by court order. 
In order that the paramouncy of the appellant's lien 
might he preserved, appellant suggested that the same 
objective could be achieved if the sale were allowed to 
stand and the property simply resold under contract. 
The contract was objectionable to respondant and bis 
wife because it would contain a forfeiture provision and 
Beneficial Life Insurance had already demonstrated that 
they weren't to be trusted, despite their ecclesiastical 
ownership. Appellants suggested that the forfeiture 
provisions could be removed by striking, but that they 
should not be struck until the agreed balloon payment 
had been made. Respondant expressed concern that the 
anticipated monies with which to make the balloon pay· 
ment miO'ht not be received exactly as anticipated, and 
0 • 
that in light of this exigency, a provision for last·mmute 
rescue must be incorporated in case the rescue developed 
into a foot-r:ace. 
After due discussion, it was agreed that wording which 
3 
would allow the def easance of the foref eiture provlSlon, 
and down to the time of an adverse trial or appellate 
decision, and down to the very moment that respondant 
was factually dispossessed, would be aceptable. Appellant 
rnggested and respondant agreed that that would be 
accomplished by the usage of the phrase "at any time." 
After due deliberation, wording of the addendum was 
finally agreed upon. It reads: 
"Addendum: Remedies provided under 
paragraph 16 (a) of this contract shall not 
be available to seller at any time after the 
attached Judgement Note has been paid. 
All other remedies shall be available at 
any time. 
The other remedies are set forth in paragraphs 16 ( c), 
and would allow the appellant, at its option, at any time, 
to either sue for delinquent installments or to forclose 
the contract as a mortgage. 
Simultaneously with the performance of the earlier 
reinstatement agreement, which was accomplished when 
the appellants signed the contract, respondant and his 
wife released the appellant and its agents from any 
claims for damages by reason of their torts and dismissed 
the causes of action in the law suit which had been 
filed to collect damages for the torts. Since the mort· 
gage had been reinstated and the agreement fully per-
formed, those causes of action seeking to compel that 
performance were also dismissed. 
Although appelants seem to delight in choosing words 
like "bankrupt" to unnecessarily belittle and discredit 
respondant for no relevant purpose, they do correctly 
9 
point out that respondant filed a petition under Chapter 
XII of the Chandler Act with the Federal District C ourt , 
on September 14, 1967. Appellant intimates and implies 
that the petition was calculated to effect or alter the 
rights of the respondant under the reinstatement agreement 
just performed. The very opposite is true. In all prob. 
ability appellant's agents never stopped long enough in 
the last 2 1/2 wears to even read the arrangement. If 
they had, they would have discovered that the plan would 
have left the subject relationship between appellant and 
respondant unaffected. They seem to close their minds 
and ears to the repeated reminder that it was fiied soley 
and exclush-elly to counteract the illegal conduct of 
Messrs Tuft, Marshall and Smith in a wholly unrelated 
law suit. 
The plan and .arrangement provided for the full and 
complete performance of the respondanf s obligation to 
Beneficial Life Insurance Company in the following 
words (Paragraph 7 of the arrangement). 
"That the $3,100.00 being held in escrow by Stan· 
ley Tile Company by applied to meet the balloon 
installment due to Beneficial Life Insurance Com· 
pany on the property owned by the debtor .. · · 
Debtor proposes keeping current all payments due 
on said contract out of current income and without 
burdening the corpus of the estate for these pay· 
ments." 
Appe1lants, in their hysterical preoccupation to cate· 
gorically oppose anything respondant proposes, and to 
adjudge ipso facto, .anything respondant suggests as some· 
thing meriting their opposition, have never stopped long 
enough to realize that the approval of the plan would 
10 
ha,·e provided insurance for the complete performance 
of respondant's obligation on the reinstated mortgage. 
Instead of supporting the plan. which would have guar· 
anteed their payments, they joined with the respondant's 
detractors and expended their energies for the next 18 
months keeping respondant in litigation, and so pre-
occupied with law suits, writs, appeals, briefs, pleadings 
and attendant difficulties that it was virtually impossible 
to do anything except live in courts, and especially im-
possible to earn an income. 
Even though one phase of that Chapter XH proceed-
ing has been resolved adversely, thanks to the mindless 
' opposition of the detractors, other phases are currently 
being pursued on appeal in the United States Courts of 
Appeal. 
Appellants m their statement of the facts make a 
great production of the action of Bruce Jenkins who gave 
approval to pursue their relief in the State Courts. The 
date originally set for hearing on the appellant's petition 
was continued to a date convenient to appellants. On the 
date of the continued hearing, appellants did not show 
up, stating that the hearing had been held, in respondant's 
absence, a day earlier, without any notice. Appellants 
also forgot to tell this court that the order of Bruce 
Jenkins is on appeal now. 
During December 1967, respondant sold his equity in 
the subject property, subject to the Beneficial lien, to one 
' C. Dwayne Harrison, who, about January 1, 1968, 
assumed possession of he property. As would be expected, 
he had the gas, lights, and water changed to his name 
as soon as he moved in. The affidavits supporting and 
opposing summary judgment, as well as the deposition 
11 
of both respondant and Mr Harrison attest ti · f · · us act 
abundantly, and the appellant has never undcrta1, 
attempted to controvert this fact. 
aen or 
Appellants were advised of the transfer of title orallv 
during meetings held in 1968. Appellants were also well 
advised that under 428 of the Chandler Act, (15 USC 
828), all proceedings were automatically stayed as to 
respondant. Appellants also knew that an .appeal was 
pending before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
also had the effect of vitiating anything appellants might 
do with respect to respondant. 
At the time all of this was gomg on, Beneficial Life 
Insurance Company was a corporation, organized and ex· 
isting under the laws of the State of Utah. Its capital stock 
was owned 100 per cent by the Corporation of the First 
Presidency of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter.rlay 
Saints. (See page 104 of the principal record, answer 
# 7.) It had a hoard of directors which re.ads like a page 
out of Who's who and discloses the following constitu· 
ency: Presidents David 0. McKay, Hugh ll. Brown, N. 
Eldon Tanner, and Joseph Fielding Smith, also Conway 
A. Ashton, Ezra Taft Benson, Victor L. Brown, J. Alma 
Burrows, Marion D. Hanks, Gordon B. Hinckley, G. 
Marion Hinckley, Howard W. Hunter, Spencer W. Kim· 
ball, Harold B. Lee, Thomas S. Monson, LeGrande Rich· 
ards, .Marion G. Romney, Roy W. Simmons, Robert L. 
Simpson,Virgil H. Smih, Henry D. TayJor, .Eugene P. 
Watkins, Ernest L. Wilkinson, and Rulon W. White. (See 
page 102 and 103 of the principal record.) 
Besides being obviously prominent in the community, 
the list of directors discloses the names of at least five 
nationally prominent and hi.ghly respected attorneys. 
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The board of directors of Beneficial Life Insurance Com-
pany, like any corporate board of directors, ran the com-
pany. 
But became men of this standing and repute would 
obYiously not tolerate the horse-play being conducted in 
the name of Beneficial Life Insurance Company by some 
of its officers and attorneys, and because men of this back-
gound would not knowingly be party to this bizarre at-
tempt on the !lart of Beneficial Life Insurance Company 
to reap a $30,000.00 windfall through legal chicanery, 
at a 30,000.00 expense to respondant, and since such un-
conscionable conduct would obviously .reflect adversely 
on the church which not only owns Beneficial Life Insur-
ance Company but which this same board of directors, 
in another capacity, governs, knowledge of these pro-
ceedings was carefully withheld from them, except Eugene 
Wakins, Conway A. Ashton and Virgil Smith, who partici-
pately directly in the management and affairs of the 
company. 
The minutes of the directors' meeting discloses that no 
action of any kind was taken by the board in this matter, 
neither was it discussed. Neither were any resolutions, 
one way or the other passed. The hoard simply did not 
know and does not know what is going on in this case. 
This whole action is the result of the contrivance of a 
small group of individuals who understandably want to 
remain nameless. 
The by-laws of the appellant contain under Article 
IV, Officers, Section 2, the standard boiler-plate pro-
visions, which delegate to the Chairman of the Board, or 
in his absence and the absence of all Vice Chairmen, to 
the president of the corporation, the right to tend to the 
13 
.affairs the corporation, like hiring and fir. 
mg clerks, and buymg rubber bands and paper clips and 
paying the phone ,hill. Indeed, this delegation might be 
sub-delegated, but the responsibility to make important 
decisions rests with the chairman of the board. The Art. 
icle provides: 
"'In the absence of the Chairman of the Board and 
of all vice chairmen, the president, if present, 
shall preside at all meetings of the stockholders 
and directors and shall have the general super· 
vision of the affairs of the corporation." 
How this can be stretched into a delegation to make 
important decisions involving the property of other people 
defies explanation, but had it been the then Chairman 
of the board who was making the decisions, one coulJ 
have been comfortable in the thought that the decision 
would have been a just and fair one. As it is, the action 
taken by the appellant was carefully withheld not only 
from the board of directors, but from the chairman of the 
board, whose first right it would be to know. President 
David 0. McKay, to whom these duties were perhaps 
delegated, was never absent and not only did not .author· 
ize the action taken by appellants, but in fact had no 
knowledge of it. 
Now nothwithstanding the knowledge of the con· 
veyanr.-e of the property to C. Dwayne Harrison, and 
the knowledge of the appellant of the 
pendency of the appeal to the Tenth Circuit, and not· 
withstandi11g the absence of any authorization to act from 
the Board of Directors, or its chairman (if he, arguendo. 
had under his general supervisory powers the right to 
make such major decisions without a from the 
14 
boarfl ) , J. Thomas Greene, served the confusino- and 
0 
contradictory notice set forth on pages 10 and 11 of the 
appellant's brief on February 19th, 1968 (but not on the 
other dates stated in appellant's brief.) 
Mr. Greene makes some mention (on page 12 and 13 
of appellant's brief) about a letter. While respondant 
does not daim that this is the first time it has come to 
his attention, since it was mentioned (for the first time) 
late in the litigation, when it was attached to .an affidavit 
which was in turn attached to a memorandum of authori-
ties which Mr. Greene submitted to Judge Croft on June 
2nd, 1969, it is extremely doubtful if it was ever sent, 
and if it was, it is extremely doubtful if it was ever 
received either by respondent or Mr. Harrison, although 
it may have been. For purposes of a review of Judge 
Croft's action it is .at least a highly suspect item and is 
not one of those uncontroverted facts which might form 
the basis of a summary judgment. 
It is true that on October 21, 1968, (as alleged in Mr. 
Greene's brief, but not on October 3rd, 1968, as inti· 
mated in his brief) respondant, (not Mr. Harrison, 
who should have been served) was served with the notice 
to vacate the premises, as set forth on page 14 and 15 
of the appellant's brief. It is likewise true that none 
of the directors, except Virgil Smith, Conway Ashton, and 
Eugene Watkins knew anything about this action, either. 
Neither did the chairman of the board. 
Two days after the notice to quit aforesaid was re· 
ceived, C. Dwayne Harrison (and not respondant) tend-
ered first to Max E. Jenson, .at Beneficial, and then on 
Mr. Jenson's instructions, tendered to J. Thomas Greene, 
two checks one in the amount of $3,192.00 and one in the 
' 
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amount of $.3,860.00 ( See page 70 of the principal record 
for Xerox pictures thereof). One check paid the co · . . . gnont 
note. m full, mcludmg interest and the other check paid 
all mstalhnents to <late, reducing the principal balance 
on the mortgage to about $28,000.00. 
Because of the appellant's illegal refusal to accept the 
same, Mr. Harrison, by written document kept the tender 
continuous. 
In May 1969, in a separate unrelated transaction, 
respondant reacquired from Mr. Harri30n the property 
in question; Mr. Harrison moved out of the home, 
respondant took possession, and at the time of Judge 
Croft's judgment re'lpondant was the owner .and con· 
tinues to be the owner of the property at this time. 
Judge Croft, upon extensive and diligent considera· 
tion of appellant's arguments rendered his decision on 
June 23rd, 1969. Parting with his custom and practice, 
he tolerated two additional hearings, one in July and one 
in September 1969 in which he patiently permitted 
appellants to re-argue and re-hash their positions and 
legal theories. In each instance he patiently reconsidered 
his former action, making all allowances he could for the 
new arguments presented, could not possibly see how the 
law would allow any result except a summary judgment 
for respondant. Appellant's case could not possibly stand 
under the multiple ohvious defects therein. 
ARGUMENT 
Judge Croft's scholarly opinion bases the on 
the notices, the actions of the appellant after the notices, 
and the tender, and in doing this, he perceptively analyzes 
the cases, applies the facts, and reaches a completely cor· 
16 
iect decision. However, even if he were wrong on these 
points, there are additional reasons he doesn't even touch 
upon which would justify the same result. His theories, 
Lased upon the notices, the conduct and the tender, which 
nre nn<ler attack by appellants will be defended by this 
response, but going beyond that, the theories which Judge 
Croft disregarded in reaching his decision, which would 
produce the same result, will also be brought to the atten-
. tion of this court as additional reasons for up holding 
' the decision of Judge Croft. 
Appellants cite seven cases as authority for their posi-
tion, but they confuse the issue by not citing them in 
chronological order. The oldest case is Forrester vs. 
Cook, 77 U 13 7, 292 P 206 ( 1930). The most recent case 
they cite is Van Zyverden vs. Farrer, 15 U 2d 367, 393 
P 2d 468 (1964). By considering them in chronological 
. orrler, one can observe the growth of the law in Utah in 
1 
forfeiture actions. 
Moreover, we are dealing here with the "rule of each 
case." Each Supreme Court opinion is the "law of the 
case" which it decides, and rests upon the facts .and issues 
which it decides. There are admittedly some similarities 
in the cases cited, but the similarities are few when com-
pared with the differences, and the general propositions 
stated are only somewhat helpful. There are no cases in 
point, and every case decided can he easily distinguished 
on the facts. 
Respondant has undertaken to do a "canned brief' 
on each case so that the propositions for which the case 
stands can be understood in light of the context in which 
the propositions are announced and in light of the facts 
of the particular case in which the opinion was rendered. 
17 
The ''canned briefs" are set forth in the appendix to thr 
respondant's brief. 
POINT I. 
FORRESTER VS COOK IS DISTINGUISHABLE ON 
THE FACTS AND IS NOT CONTROLLING. 
The Forrester vs. Cook case (77 U 137, 292, P 206, 
1930) is really not very helpful. It took a later decision to 
articulate and differentiate the difference between self. 
executing and non-self executing provisions in a forfeiture 
clause in a contract. (Leona vs. Zunig.a, infra). But that 
is wholly unimportant. The provision in the Forrester 
conract was self-executing. It stated: 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof by the buyer or upon failure to make any 
payment when the same shall become due, or 
within sixty days thereafter, the seller shall be 
released from all obligations in law and equity .... 
(etc.) . . . the buyer at once becoming a tenant 
at will of the seller." 
The notice which the seller served upon the buyer 
said the following 
"You and each of you will further take notice 
that by reason of your failure to make the pay· 
ments hereinbefore referred to, you and each of 
you under the tenns of said agreement have he· 
come and now .are and are hereby declared to he 
the tenants at will of Diana Forrester; and as such 
l 1 • d t vacate you and each of you are iereny reqmre o ' 
· t} ereof the property ... and surrender possess10n 1 · 
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to said Diana Forrester within five days from the 
<late of the service of this notice upon you." 
The buyers first refused to comply, then later, but 
prior to trial, disclaimed any interest in the property and 
tendered possession to the seller. 
The law suit was not over possession, but over the 
question of damages and attorney fees. The opinion, in 
fact, states so expressly: (Page 208) 
"The cause was thereupon tried upon the issues of 
damages and an attorney's fee only." 
The trial court allowed trebled damaged and denied 
an attorney's fee. Both parties appealed. The only issues 
which were before the Supreme Court for decision were 
(1) Whether the claim for the hold-over was "rent" or 
"damages," damages being subject to being trebled and 
rent not being subject to being trebled, and (2) whether 
an attorney's fee would lie. 
The Supreme Court made the statement which 
Appellants cite on p.age 25 of the brief in order to estab-
lish at which point the buyers became tenants at will of 
the sellers. 
POINT II. 
THE CASE OF LEONA VS. ZUNIGA DOES NOT 
STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION FOR WHICH 
APPELLANT CITES IT. 
In reading the Leona vs. Zuniga case ( 84 U 417, 34 
P 2d 699, 1934) and re-reading the case, and reading and 
re.reading what appellant claims for it, it becomes increas-
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uncle.ar how this case coald in any way relate to the 
issues at bar in the instant case. 
The Leona vs. Zuniga case was indeed a very im. 
portant milestone in the growth of the law, but it doesn't 
stand for anything helpful in this case. The Leona vs. 
Zuniga case holds that the seller's complaint for possession 
didn't state a cause of action because it did not allege that 
seller had given buyer notice of seller's election. 
Now how that can possibly bear on anything relevant 
in this case is something appellant should explain better. 
There was no way the Supreme Court could decide (in 
the Leona vs. Zuniga case) the sufficiency of a notice 
that was never served. 
The dictum is interesting, however. It distinguishes 
between self-executing and non-seif-executing provisions 
in .a contract, and gives a good example of each kind. It 
observed that the Leona-Zuniga contract was unlike the 
Bergman vs. contract ( 68 U 178, 249 P 4 70), which 
was self-executing, and like the Howorth vs. Mills (62 
U 574, 221 P 165) contract, which was not self-executing, 
and which required notice from seller to buyer that the 
seller had made the election availabe to him in order to 
put the buyer in unlawful detainer status. 
The articulation of the rationale in the Leona vs. 
Zuniga case is very helpful. The court clarified the rea· 
son for the holding. It said that in non-self-executing 
type forfeiture contracts, the seller merely gains the right 
to make elections upon the buyer's default. He may 
elect to stand up on his right to declare .a forfeiture, or 
may elect to waive the forfeiture and to enforce the con· 
tract according to its terms. The object of the language 
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is to give the ven<ler his election. If he wants to arnil 
himself of his right to avoid the contract, he must make an 
unequivocal election evidencing that intention. A con-
trary rule would place the buyer in a dilemma. If the 
buyer vacates the premises, he may be confronted with 
an acticn to enforce the contract. If he fails to vacate, 
he may be met with a suit for possession. 
In one respect, the Leona vs. Zuniga case is similar to 
the case at b.ar. Respondant certainly agrees that the case 
at bar !s not self-executing. But the similarity ends there. 
Asi<le from the fact that the Leona-Zuniga contract did 
not have an addendum, like the case at bar, which took 
away the forfeiture remedies entirely, the forfeiture 
clause itself is vastly different. 
By juxtaposing the two_ clauses, the differences can be 
readily ascertained. The Leona-Zuniga contract provided 
as follows: 
'"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms 
hereof, by buyer, or upon failure to make any 
payment when the same shall become due, or 
within 60 days thereafter, the seller, at his option, 
shall at his option be released ... (etc). 
The clause at the case at bar provides as follows: 
"Upon the failure of the buyer to make any pay-
ment or payments when the same shall become 
due, or within 30 days thereafter, the seller, at 
his option shall have the following alternative 
remedies, (a) Seller shall have the right, upon 
faiure of the buyer to remedy the default within 
five days after written notice, to be released .... 
(etc). 
In the Leona-Zuniga contract, the seller had the auto-
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matic option, after 60 days of continuous default in mak. 
ing payments, to be released. If that seller, (Leona) had 
only acted upon that option, had only given the notice of 
his election that option entitled him to give, and had only 
alleged in his complaint that he had, by written notice 
exercised the option he was entiled to exercise, the Su: 
preme Court probably would not have mandated the dis. 
trict court to sustain the buyer's demurrer to the seller's 
complaint. 
In the instant Beneficial Life Insurance case, as dis· 
tinguished from the Leona-Zuniga case, the appellant has 
no rights at all until there is a 30 day default. But only 
after 30 days, when it ha3 some choices to make, can it 
make some choices. It can proceed with remedy (b) (file 
suit to recover the delinquent payments), or with remedy 
( c) (foreclose the contract like a mortgage) without any 
further notice at all. Remedies 16(h) and l6(c) are 
available without giving any notices first. 
However, if it chooses remedy (a), it must first 0£ all 
give notice that the contract is in default and demand that 
the default be remedied within five days after notice. 
It must then patientlly await the expiration of five days. 
If the buyer does not remedy the default in the five days, 
seller has some new choices. It can do several things at 
that point: 
I. Do nothing at all. 
2. Treat the contract as being in full force and effect, 
and proceed to enforce it. 
3. Exercise the remedies available in paragraph 
16(b ). 
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4. Exercise the remedies available m paragraph 
16(c). 
5. Exercise its remedy available in paragraph 16 (a) 
to be released from his obligations in law and equity to 
conYey the property, forfeit the payments made as liqui-
dated damages (under certain very strict conditions, not 
present here), and re-enter and take possession of the 
property (if it can do so without breaching the peace), 
which, if it succeeds in doing, would make the respond-
ant a tenant at will of the appellant. 
There is only one hitch. If respondant elects not to 
do nothing at all, and not to treat the contract as being in 
full force and effect, and not to exrcise he remedies pro-
dded in 16(b) and 16(c), it must give an additional 
notice that it has elected to exercise the rights which are 
conditionally given to it in paragraph 16 (a). 
But the appellant doesn't have any rights to exercise 
until after the contract is 30 days in default, AND after 
the appellant has given notice to remedy the default 
within 5 days, AND after five days have elapsed that the 
respondent has not remedied the default. 
Now if all of that happens, the appellant can start 
making its choices. The appellant might choose to do 
any number of things, but if it chooses to go on with 
remery 16 (a), it must notify respondant that it is going 
to do that and not something else. And if it does notify 
respondant that it is going to go on with remedy 16(a), 
and respondant doesn't allow the appellant to re-enter 
the premises, .as the contract provides, then the appellant 
would have succeeded in putting the respondant in statu-
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tory unlawful detainer status, and could file its suit for 
possession. 
Now the unlawful detainer statutes require that one 
m unlawful detainer status is entitled to still additional 
in writing, requiring in the alternative the per. 
:tormance of (the breached) conditions or covenants 
' or the surrender of the property. It also provides that 
within three days after the service of the notice, the 
tenant (or other interested parties) may perform (the 
breached) conditions or covenants .and hereby save the 
(contract) from forfeiture. (See 68.36-3 ( 5). 
Now no decision in Utah has gone as far as to describe 
each of the notices required, mainly because it hasn't 
needed to in order to decide the cases. Mr. George Mc· 
Millan, who argued the case for the Van Zyverdens in 
their case against Seagull Investment Co. ( 15 U 2d 367, 
393 P 2d 468) urged this court to consider the additional 
notices required by the unlawful detainer statute itself, 
but since this court found the Van Zyverden notices in· 
sufficient to place the Van Zyverdens in unlawful detain· 
er status, it was unnecessary to decide the question Mr. 
McMillan urged in his brief, namely, what notices a per· 
son in unlawful detainer status is entiled to, and what 
he might do to save his contract, once he is in that status. 
\Vhen we get to thhe Van Zyverden case in this brief, 
we will examine the argument in greater detail. 
But to end the consideration of the Leona vs. Zuniga 
case with an unanswered question, we might ask ourselves 
why appellant would cite a case which holds that at least 
some notice must be given in order to state a cause of 
action. No one quarrels with that proposition, but how 
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is appellant helped by it? We need to examine cases 
where notices were served, not where they weren't served, 
and look into the facts and rationale to find out how and 
when they might he served and what they have to say 
in order to he legally sufficient. 
POINT III. 
THE CHRISTY VS. GUILD IS IN POINT IN 
PART BUT IS DISTINGUISHABLE ON THE 
FACTS FROM THE INSTANT CASE. 
Of .all of the cases appellant cites, Christy vs. Guild 
(101 U 313, 121 P 2d 401, 1942) is its strongest case, hut 
it can easily he distinguished from the case at bar. The 
case is set forth in "canned brief" form in the appendix, 
hut briefly, the transaction involved a $3,200.00 home on 
which the buyer made no down payment, hut agreed to 
pay the entire purchase price in deferred installments 
of $20.00 for six months, then $25.00 for six months, then 
S30.00 for six months for the duration of the contract. 
The Supreme Court did not favor us with the language 
of the contract, as it usually does in forfeiture cases, but 
merely paraphrased it. On the very last page of the 
opinion, under the second paragraph of headnote ( 5), 
we read the following: 
"In the present action, respondants in their com· 
plaint set out the contract, which provided that 
upon default of the vendees, the vendors might 
elect to terminate the contract and upon such 
termination might retain as liquidated damages 
the payments theretofore made by the vendees, 
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the latter thereupon becoming tenants at the \iill 
of the former . 
. Since this case is one of the most important case; 
which. appellants cite, it was thought wise to get the 
before us, so that it can be compared 
with the mstant case. The files and records of the Salt 
Lake County Clerk's office contain the contract, which 
is reproduced, in part in the appendix. The exact wordina 
0 
of the salient provisions of the contract reads as follows: 
'"On failure of the parties of the second part, ... to 
make any of the payments when due or for fifteen 
days after they become due, ... or on faailure to 
comply with the provisions of this agreement in 
any other respect, all payments made under this 
contract may, at the option of the parties of the 
first part, become forfeited ... as liquidated dam· 
ages, ... " 
Juxtaposing that language with the language of the 
Beneficial Life conract we can draw the comparisons anJ 
disinctions. The language in this (The Beneficial) con· 
tract, already set forth earlier in this brief, provides that 
only after 30 days default, and only after the failure of 
the respondant to remedy the default after 5 days written 
notice, does the appellant have the elections the seller 
in the contract automatically had upon 60 
days default. There is quite a difference. Both the 
instant contract and the Chrisy-Guild contract require the 
seller to make an affirmative, overt election and to give 
the buyer notice that the election was made. But there 
the similarity ends. In the Christy-Guild contract, the 
seller had the right to make an election after 60 days of 
unremedied continuous default in making installments. 
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In the instant (Beneficial) contract, the seller had the 
right to serve a demand after 30 days of unremedied con-
tinuous default. To say there is an obvious difference is 
an unpardonable understatement. 
The Christy vs. Guild case is a baffling case, however. 
The buyers tendered partial performance of the defaults 
prior to suit. They were required, by the notice of elec-
tion, to bring current $130.00 in arrearages, pay $297.20 
in back taxes and insurance, and made improvements on 
the property they had agreed to make. The buyers 
tendered the .arrearages, but did not tender the back taxes 
and insurance and did not make the improvements. 
The buyers apparently felt secure in the tender of 
the partial performance required by the notice. They 
at least felt secure enough to argue that it was a question 
for the jury as to whether there was a default, their theory 
apparently being that the partial tender remedied the 
default. 
On appeal, the appellants (in the Christy vs. Guild 
case) didn't even attack the sufficiency of the notice. 
The appellants (in that case) simply argued that ( 1) the 
default was a question for the jury and ( 2) that the trial 
court should have considered the "equities" between the 
parties and have adjudged the buyers entitled to some 
reimbursement for the improvements made and the large 
amount paid on the contract (approximately one-third 
of the principal plus interest). 
The second point seemed to bother the court some, 
hut it found that in light of the fact that the buyers had 
paid no down payment, only $20.00 for six months, then 
$25.00 for six months, then $30.00 per month thereafter, 
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and that the improvemens made were reasonably worth 
$2,000.00 and that the property had yielded a net income 
of $75.00 per month, and that the buyers had been in 
possession from 1935 to 194.2, that there were no equities 
in favor of the buyers to be considered. 
1 
It is curious to ponder the holding of that case in 
light of the issues presented by instant case. 
The first issue in the Christy vs. Guild case was 
whether undisputed evidence on a question of fact should 
be submitted to a jury for determination. 
The Supreme Court held it need not be. 
The second issue was whether the forfeiture on the 
facts of this case constituted a forefeiture. 
The Supreme Court held that on the facts oE the 
Christy vs. Guild case, the forfeiture was not a penalty. 
Beneficial Life Insurance Co. has failed to tell us in 
their brief how the Christy vs. Guild issues relate to the 
isssues between Beneficiial Life Insurance Co. and 
respondant. 
POINT IV. 
THE PACIFIC DEVELOPMENT VS. STEWARll' 
CASE IS IN POINT IN PART BUT IS DISTIN· 
GUISHABLE ON THE FACTS FROM THE IN· 
STANT CASE. 
The Pacific Development vs. Stewart case (113 U 
403, 195 P 2d 748, 1948) case is very much like the 
Christy vs. Guild case, but it can be distinguished from 
Christy vs. Guild on the facts of the case and on the 
;,.mes decided on appeal. 
On the facts, the Stewart property involved a 
S.5.900.00 purchase with $100.00 down. The balance 
of the purchase price was pay.able in deferred monthly 
installments of $55.00. The rental value of the property 
was $.50.00. The Christy vs. Guild case involved a 
$3,200.00 property with no down payment, and the entire 
halance payable in deferred paymens beginning at $20.00 
and ending at $30.00 per month. The rental value of the 
Christy property w.as $75.00 per month. 
In the Christy vs. Guild case, the buyer tendered 
partial per/ ormance on the demanded performance prior 
to the time suit was filed. In the Pacific Development vs. 
Stewart case, the buyer tendered no per/ ormance at all, 
even up to and including the time in trial. The court 
also held that Stewarts would not have been unable to 
perform even if giHn a longer time in wi1ich to do so. 
The issue before the Court in the Christy case was 
whether the evidence presented a question for the jury 
and whether the forfeiture was a penalty. 
The issue before the Court in the Pacific case was 
whether 23 days was a reasonable period of time in which 
to cure the default. The trial court found 23 days un-
reasonable. The Supreme Court found 23 days reason-
able. 
As far as the contract prov1s10ns are concerned, the 
Stewart and Christy cases are alike, but in their alikeness, 
are unlike the contract provisions in the Beneficial 
contract. 
. This difference has already been pointed out (in 
pomt 3 supra). In both the Christy and Pacific cases 
the buyer was automatically given the right to make ai; 
election after 60 days of continuous default. 
In ihe Beneficial contract, the appellant has the right 
to make an election to be released ONLY IF the contract 
is 30 days or more in default, AND ONLY IF he then 
gives 5 days notice to remedy the default, AND ONLY 
IF, after 5 days notice, he buyer has failed to remedy the 
default. Now assuming arguendo, all of this has hap· 
pened, it may make an election. Now IF it makes that 
election, and IF it gives notice to the respondant of that 
election, he may (under certain conditions not here pres· 
ent) place the respondant in unlawful detainer status. 
AND IF it gives the statutory notices required by the un· 
lawfu detainer statutes AND IF the respondant does not 
comply, it may file a suit for dispossession. 
There are other distinctions, which question the 
service of the notices, the equities, the penalty forfeiture, 
the need for appellant not to obstruct respondant's per· 
formance, and which question the sufficiency of the 
notices, but that will be saved for later argument in order 
to avoid too much redundancy. 
POINT V. 
FUHRIMAN VS. BISSEGGER IS NOT IN POINT. 
The court held in the Fuhriman vs. Bissegger case 
(13 U 2d 379, 375 P 2d 27) as in the Leona vs. Zuniga 
case that since the contract had no self-executing pro· ' vision, a notice was necessary, and since the seller gave 
the buyer no notices, there could be no forfeiture and 
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1 Lhe counterclaim of buyer, to compel specific perform-
aace should be upheld. 
Among numerous obvious differences, which are 
1 amply set forth in the discussion of the prior cases, and 
, which do not need repeating here, it might be noted that 
. the contract called for $10.00 per month and that the 
I buyer was in possession of the property from .about 1946 
to 1952. 
i 
i It seems almost a shame to dignify this citation with 
: further responses and it leaves us wondering why 
1 appellant chose to cite the case at all. 
POINT VI. 
JACOBSEN VS. SWAN IS NOT IN POINT. 
Appellants have so completely mis-quoted Jacobsen 
i rs. Swan (3 Utah 2<l 59, 278 P 2d 294, 1954) case that 
there is cause for "ome alarm, if it be found that it was 
intentional. The citation on page 26 of the appelllant's 
brief doesn't relate to the purchase contract at .all. Appel-
lants would (mis) (?)lead us into believing that the 
Supreme Court, in discussing the question of tender, was 
talking about tender of performance under a vendor-
rcntlee contract. 
This is a rank case of misquoting an opinion by lift-
ing the quotation out of context and giving it a meaning 
not intended by the court. 
The Jacobsen vs. Swan case does not involve the 
litigation over a sale purchase contract, but over a lease 
agreement. It is true there was initially a contract be-
tween Jacobsen and Swan, but it was twice superseded. 
The contract which was executed in June, 1947, was, be-
cause of aggr:avated defaults thereunder, cancelled by 
mutual consent and replaced with a lease agreement. 
That lease agreement because of aggravated defauts there. 
under, was cancelled by mutual consent and replaced 
with .a new lease agreement on June 27, 1950. On March 
5, 1952, lessor served lessee with an unconditional notice 
to quit. On August 12, 1952, a similar unconditional 
notice to quit was served. When the lessees failed to quit, 
an unlawful detainer action was filed. 
As an interesting aside, the trial court gave the buyer 
judgment against seller for $3,190.00, being the excess of 
the monies paid to seller over the rental v.alue of the 
property. The Supreme Court gave the buyer even more, 
and required the seller to account, in addition to the sums 
awarded by the trial court, for excess payments under 
the first lease and excess payments under the second 
lease. 
POINT VII. 
THE VAN ZYVERDEN VS. SEAGULL CASE IS 
VERY MUCH IN POINT AS FAR AS SOME ISSUES 
ARE CONCERNED, BUT CAN BE DISTIN· 
GUISHED ON OTHER ISSUES, AND IN PART, ON 
THE FACTS. 
The Van Zyverden vs. Seagull case ( 15 U 2d 364, 393 
P 2d 468, 1964) is the most helpful of all cases cited, and 
being the most recent of the seven cases cited by appell.ant, 
is the most controlling. But in addition to these obvious 
reasons to pay greater heed to its holding, it is most closely 
in point on the facts relating to the notice. 
In that case, the court held that the notice to the Van 
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Zpenlcns of February 10, 1962 was not effective to per-
frd Scagull's right to maintain an unlawful detainer 
action. 
Now that Court does not say in its opin.ion what notice 
it was was served on February 10, 1962, hut implies 
that the notice of February 10, 1962 was served because 
' of some uncrtainty in the sufficiency of the notice served 
Jannary 3, 1962. Neither the briefs of Mr. McMillan who 
argued the case for the Van Zyverdens, nor the brief of 
Earker, wl10 argued the case for Se.agull shed any 
1 light on which notices were served on which dates. Only 
through an examination of the records of Wasatch County 
Clerk's office could this he ascertained. 
Copies of the relevant documents have been xeroxed 
and are supplied in the appendix to this brief. 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract is dated Septem· 
, lwr 25, 1960. Ralph W. Farrer and his wife appear as 
sellers and Leo Van Zyverden and his wife appear as 
buyers. The sellers assigned their interest in the contract 
to Seagull. 
The contract provided for a purchase price of $60, 
000.00, refleckd a down payment of $5,000.00, and a 
halancc of $55,000.00 to be paid in deferred annual 
installments of $2,750.UO beginning November 1, 1961. 
The forfeiture clause in the contract in question was 
worded identically with the Beneficial Life contract, 
(except that the Van Zyverden contract did not have 
the acl<lenda). 
It like the Beneficial Life contract, provided that 
' upon the failure of the buyer to make payments when 
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due, or within 30 days thereafter, the seller at his opt' 
' !On shall have the following alternative remedies: 
A. Seller shall have the right, upon failure of the 
buyer to remedy the default within five days 
after written notice, to be released from all ob]i. 
gations in law and equity to convey said property 
... and to forfeit all payments as liquidated dam. 
ages . . . the buyer becoming at once a tenant at 
will. ... 
On December 1, 1961, Seagull declare<l the contract 
in default, and by written notice served on that date, gave 
the Van Zyverdens until noon on December 7, ] 961 to 
remedy the default. 
On January 3, 1962, Seagull served another somewhat 
redundant notice in expanded form alleging other de-
faults, and demanding in the last paragraph of that notice, 
that the buyers remedy the defaults within 5 days, in this 
language: 
You are further notified that in the event that 
you fail to remedy your defaults in performance 
of the contract annexed hereto as exhibit "A", and 
to perform the covenants and conditions which you 
are obligated to perform under the terms of said 
contract within five days . . . (etc.). 
On January 16, 1962, Seagull filed an action against 
the Van Zyverdens, in unlawful detainer. 
On February 10, 1962, R. E. Weaver, constable, served 
a "Notice to Vacate Premises," which required the Van 
Zyverdens to vacate the premises within 5 days. 
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On February 13, 1962, he Seagulls filed a countcr-
cl:iim in the action which the Van Zyverdens had filed 
Se.agull on December 1, 1961. The cases were 
consolidated for trial. 
The trial court held that the notice of February 10, 
1962 was not effective to perfect Seagull's right to main-
tain unlawful detainer in that action. 
If one follows the dates of the events closely, one 
might infer that the reason for the court's action was 
that the actions were filed prematurely. It does indeed 
appear that Seagull got ahead of itself, but that is not 
the hasi.s of the ruling. 
On January 16, 1962, when Seagull file<l its action, 
it had only served the one notice "'to remedy the default 
wihin 5 days of the notice," although it apparently served 
a similar notice on December 1, 1961. While it is un-
disputed that Seagull served a five day notice twice, (even 
1 though the second notice was worded somewhat different-
ly) it was deemed to be two services of the same five day 
1 
notice, because he notices demanded the identical per-
formance on the part of the buyer. 
On February 13, 1962, when Seagull filed its counter-
claim, it had only allowed three days to ealpse since its 
"notice to quit" was served (it was served on February 
10, 1962). 
The timing was obviously wrong .and was by itself 
sufficient to justify a dismissal of Seagull's unlawful 
detainer action, hut we should not allow ourselves to be 
distracted from the holding and rationale of the case, as 
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reported, by these inci<lenal facts, which would ha-,e 
justified the same result on a different legal theory. 
The Van Zyverden case is not decided on the timin• 
of the notices. It is based upon the failure of the selle; 
to make the elections he was entitled to make, when he 
was entitled to ma/re them, and to give notice of those 
elections to the buyer. 
The Supreme Court, in referring to paragraph 16(a) 
cited just prior to the following quote, says: 
"This provision requires the seller to make his elec. 
tion, and the buyer is entitled to notice that he 
has done so." 
Now what election is the court talking about? One 
could easily misunderstand that it refers to the option 
contained in the stem of paragraph 16 and not the right 
to elect that is contained in paragraph A, since the words 
to be found in the stem "at his option" are italicized for 
emphasis. 
The election the court is talking about is not the 
option referred to in the stem to choose between remedies 
A, B, and C, but the election the seller has to make 
AFTER he has given the five day notice required by para· 
graph A, and AFTER five days have elapsed, .and AFTER 
the five day failure of buyer to respond. This means that 
after one election is made it must he followed by another 
election at least five days later. 
The opinion cannot have any other meaning. Para· 
graph A set forth in the opinion is indented on both sides. 
It is set off in quotes, as a sub-paragraph should he. Im· 
mediately following the close of quotes, the opinion said 
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"This provision requires seller to maJ;e his election." 
\rlwt provision requires seller to make his election? The 
proYision in paragraph A. While an antecedent option 
was already exercised, in deciding between A, B, and C, 
the opinion does not refer to this antecedent exercise of 
options between A, B, and C, but the election which A 
itself requires, AFTER the five day notice is served and 
AFTER five days have elapsed, and AFTER the five day 
failure of buyer to respond. The option referred to in 
the stem is exercised BEFORE the five day notice, and 
a priori, before any other notices are served. 
The Van Zyverden case is extremely closely reasoned. 
It is .amazing to observe the fidelity with which appellant 
in its brief has reproduced the opinion, and has correctly 
observed that the Van Zyverden opinion held that whether 
a cause of action in unlawful detainer exists is to be 
determined at the time the action is commencd and that 
the notices were insufficient to impart notice of an elec-
tion of the optional forf eiure remedy under par.agraph 
16A. 
On page 33 of the appellant's brief, however, is a 
disturbing and erroneous conclusion in an attempt to 
apply the legal principles pronounced in the opinions the 
appellant cites, to the facts of this case. 
Mr. Greene says: (in the second paragraph on page 
33) 
"Paragraph 16A is non-sef-executing provision sim-
ilar to those in Christy vs. Guild, Pacific Develop-
ment Company vs. Stewart and Van Zyverden vs. 
Farrer." 
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At the bottom of page 33, he continues: 
within paragraph 16A is clearly ex. 
plamed m Leona vs. Zuniga where the Court con. 
strued a virtually identical provision, stating that 
1t: etc . . ( ) " 
None of the cases, Christy vs. Guild, Pacific Develop. 
ment vs. Stewart and Leona vs. Zuniga stand for the pro-
position he urges. It is indeed true that they deal with 
non-self-executing contracts, and that regard they are like 
the contract at bar, but in what these options and elec· 
tions entitle the seller to do, and when he may exercise 
them, they are unlike the case at bar and the Van 
Zyverden case. (Van Zyverden and the case at bar are 
alike.) 
In the Christy, Pacific, and Leona cases, the seller 
had the option automatically to be released, etc., etc., in 
case of buyer's default. He only had to exercise it and 
give notice to the buyer, in writing, that he had 
it. 
In the case at bar and in the Van Zyverden case, the 
seller had the option of choosing between A, B, and C, in 
case of buyer's default. Now if he chose B and C, he 
could give notice of that election and proceed with the 
remedies B and C provided. But if he chose A, he had 
to bAgin by giving a 5-day notice to remedy the default, 
and then wait five days, and then upon the buyer's five 
day failure to respond, make another election, and to 
give the buyer notice of this election. This, Seagull failed 
to do, and this is what the Supreme Court talks about in 
the Van Zyverden opinion. This Beneficial Insurance Co. 





other reasons for dismisssing the complaint, it is fatally 
dcf ective on this ground alone. 
It is interesti"ng to follow the logic of Mr. George 
McMillan on page 32 of his brief in the Van Zyverden 
case. He claimed that even if Seagull had followed all 
of these notices, i.t could not successfully maintain an 
unlawful detainer action until it had served the buyer 
wih the requisite stautory notices. The court never pur-
sneJ thi'> argument. but it is interesting. If one turns to 
the Unlawful Detainer Statutes, one observes that once 
one gets into unlawful detainer status, certain statutory 
notices, (in addition to the contractual notices) are re-
quired. In other words, it takes all of the contractual 
notices to get a buyer into unlawful detainer status, and 
then once in unlawful detainer status, it takes statutory 
notice to get him out of possession. Neither this case nor 
the Van Zyverden case need go that far, but it does pro· 
vide an interesting glimpse into the future. 
POINT VIII. 
APPELLANT HAS NEVER OWNED THE PROPER-
TY WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF THIS LITl-
GA TION. 
Beginning on the bottom of page 40, appellants make 
the incredible claim that they were the owners of the 
subject property at the time the complaint was filed. The 
same deception which they attempted to foist upon the 
trial court, they now try to foist upon the Supreme Court. 
They base their whole claim to ownership on the 
sheriff's return of sale and the record title. Respondant's 
affidavit does not admit that the appellant is the fee title 
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I 
holder, hut does admit that appellant is the record title 
1
\ 
holder. Do we have to play children's games with words 
and labels? Do we have to resort to such deception in 
order to avoid the substance of things? 
If words aren't supposed to convey concepts and 
ide.as, why do we even use them? If we twist a word or 
use it to convey the exact opposite meaning it is supposed 
to have, what integrity are words and meanings supposed 
to have? 
Of course the Sheriff's return shows a change of 
record title. We aren't concerned here with what the 
sheriff's return shows. We are concerned with what it 
doesn't show. It doesn't show that the foreclosure was 
pursuant to a stipulation, and with the understanding that 
the mortgagors would continue to own the property and be 
entitled to a reinstatement upon the payment of the back 
paymentE>. Is a sheriff's return supposed to show the 
underlying agreement? Is our thinking so juvenile that 
we have to stop and explain things like this? 
Of course the record title shows in the appellant. How 
could it be otherwise? The County Recorder doesn't stop 
to as questions .about how documents came into existence. 
Is she supposed to? What would happen to her if she 
refused to record recordable documents? Her office is a 
repository for documents, not a board of inquiry. She 
records the documents placed before her for the benefit 
of third parties who may know the actual facts. Are we 
so bereft of reason and such robots that we have to waste 
people's time in explaining such obvious facts? 
What does it mean to be an "owner" of property? 
Is this the same as being ''record title holder?" What does 
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•·fee title" mean? Does the record title holder in this case 
(appellant) enjoy the same status as the sellers in the 
se,·eu cases cited in appellant's brief? 
Harry Emerson Fos<lick has characterized our rrenera-o 
tion as one mindlessly pursuing slogans .and labels without 
regard to the substance of the labels, designations and 
terms which we throw around like so many magpies. Is 
appellant trying to prove him correct? 
POINT IX. 
APPELLANT EVER SOLD TO AND RESPOND. 
ANT NEVER BOUGHT FROM ANYTHING FROM 
EACH OTHER. 
On page 41 of the brief, appellant pursues the ab-
surdity of its complaint a little further. It recites para-
graph 3 of its complaint and then urges the Supreme 
Court, of all things, to believe it. 
Just what does it means to sell something? What does 
it mean to buy somethjng? What happened to the buyer 
and seller in each of the seven cases quoted by appellants 
in their brief? 
Did the seven buyers and the seven sellers in the cases, 
quoted as authorities, contract at the market price for the 
property which w:as bought and sold? Were any of the 
buyers suing the seller to compel the "seller" to perform 
it8 agreement to reinstate the mortgage which it had 
wrongfully and illegally, but nonetheless in pursuance to 
a stipulation, foreclosed in exchange for an agreement to 
reinstate it upon the payment of the back payments? 
Did the "sellers" in each of the seven cases cited by 
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the appellant's "sell" the property for approximately 50 
per cent of its value? Did any of the sellers arrive at an 
asking price by taking the mortgage balance, ad<ling ac-
crued interest and deducting the payments? (Note the 
unusual sales price of $34,,613.59) Did any of the sellers 
agree to .accept an interest rate on the deferred balance 
1 per cent below prevailing interest rates on mortgages? 
(Note the 5 1/2 per cent rate in the contract-the exact rate 
in the mortgage.) 
Were there any of the •'sellers" in each of the seven 
who had never set foot inside of the house that was 
being "sold"? Had any of the ''buyers" been in occupancy 
.and ownershp of the home they were "purchasing" three 
years before they bought it from the "seller"? 
Are appellants trying to tell the court that they are 
"sellers" like the seven sellers in the seven cases cited? 
Are appellants trying to tell the court that the respon<lant 
was a "buyer" like the seven buyers in the seven cases 
cited? 
Just what is it the appellants are trying to tell the 
court? That they feel secure in the status a label might 
confer upon them? That the substance of an item is of 
no consequence? That law is concerned with labels and 
slogans and not substance? Or just wherein do rational 
men fail to undersand these appellants? 
POINT X. 
ALLOWANCE OF THE FOREFEITURE WOULD 
RESULT IN A $30,000.00 WINDFALL TO APPEL· 
LANT AND A $30,000.00 PENALTY TO RESPOND· 
ANT. 
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W11ile a<lvocacy has always been an art, it has reached 
new heights of perfection in .appeBant's case. The 
appellant has been able to achieve an impression 100 per 
cent false without making one false statement. 
Paragraph 4 oI the complaint and the argument on 
the bottom of page 47 of appellant's brief would actually 
lead the court to believe that a forefeiture of respondant's 
equity would result in a $266.00 loss. 
What happened to the $60,000.00 home that was on 
the lot in 1965? What happened to the $28,000.00 mort-
gage that was left owing on the home after the payments 
made in October 1968? What happened to the $32,000.00 
equity? 
The answer is very easy, according to the appellants. 
$32,000.00 got lost in the paper work. After all, it's not 
homes .and improved real estate that's involved here. It's 
just papers, and documents, and things like that which 
have no intrinsic value. 
If the paper work shows a $226.00 forfeiture, that's 
all that matters? What the paper work really reflects is 
of no interest or consequence? 
Are the appellants trying to tell us that the "buyers" 
in the seven cases cited all forfeited a 55% equity to those 
"sellers" who prevailed in their forfeiture actions? 
Are the appellants really trying to tell us that they 
have been damaged $32,000.00 if the contract was, argu-
en<lo breached? Are they trying to tell us that a $32,000.00 
forfeiture is not a penalty? Is this a church-owned insti-
tution which is urging such views upon us? 
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These questions were Yery ably answered by 
Croft. Despite all attempts on the part of the appellants 
to hide and cover up the obvious equities between the 
parties, Judge Croft saw through the scheme and, in his 
opinion first questioned why Beneficiial Life Insurance 
Company, a church-owned institution, would turn down 
the money which the contract called for. He then an· 
swered his own question by observing that this was an 
extremely valuable piece of property, and accepting the 
money would simply return to Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company the money which they originally loaned upon 
the property, together with interest at the agreed rate, 
and would deny to them the windfall. 
Is he really saying that Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company is motivated by ordinary, old fashioned, every· 
day greed, and covetness? Is this really a study in human 
behavior which reveals the lengths to which people will 
go in constructing fictions .and pretenses in order to gain 
a windfall at the expense of another person? Is this a 
study of the morals of certain church-owned institutions 
and the people who run them and make their de· 
cisions? Have we forgotten that in this case, the courts 
who hear such matters sit as courts of equity and not 
courts of law? Have we forgotten that courts of equity 
are charged with insuring justice? Have we forgotten 
that in order to seek equity, a plaintiff must first do 
equity, or in other words come into court with clean 
hands? Does this type of subterfuege, do these pretenses, 
does this covert attempt to obtain a windfall reflect the 
appellant's definition an<l understanding of "equity'?" 
Has the world gone completely mad? 
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H, assuming, arguendo, the appellant denies or ques-
tions the equities, where are the affidavits which place 
at issue the values set forth in respondant's affidavits? 
(Sec page 199 of the principal record) 
If appellants t?..ke issue with facts established by 
affidavits, they have the perfect right to file opposing 
affidavits. If the values set forth in respondant's affi-
davits are not true, where are the opposing affidavits? 
POINT XI. 
A PERSON SEEKING A FORFEITURE MUST 
SERVE THE NOTICES ON THE PARTY WHO 
OWNS THE PROPERTY AT THE TIME THE 
NOTICES WERE SERVED. 
The subject property was sold to C. Dwayne Harrison 
in December 1967. He paid for it with an interest in a 
data-processing bureau which he had previously owned 
with his brother. Respondant and Mr. Harrison worked 
closely in a number of projects for about a year and a half 
and then split up. 
In May, 1969, when respondant and Mr. Harrison 
split up, respondant reacquired the property from Mr. 
Harrison. 
Mr. Harrison was m actual, physical possession of 
the property during the entire period of his ownership. 
Utilities were furnished to him, obviously, in his own 
name and on his own account. 
Appellant was told repeatedly about Mr. Harrison's 
ownership, possession, and occupancy. It is, indeed 
possible that appellant didn't understand. For nearly 
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two years, appellant's agents didn't listen to anything or 
read anything which would distract them from the pur-
suit of their major objectives. Mr. Harrison's owner-
ship was open, notorious, and obvious, and not secret and 
covert like appellant tried to make it look to Judge Croft. 
They talk about proof. The affidavits which accom-
pany the motions for summary judgement establish this 
fact beyond question. Appellant has, understandably, 
never undertaken to controvert any of them. Because 
they are not controverted, they are to be considered to 
be proven facts. 
The appellants urge the court to grant a forfeiture 
because the person on whom they did serve some de-
fective and insufficient notices acquired the property 
during the course of the litigation. 
Are they really serious? Do the seven cases which 
they cite stand for such a proposition? Do any cases 
stand for such a proposition? 
POINT XII. 
THE RELEASE RESPONDANT EXECUTED HAS 
NO REVELANCY TO ANY ISSUES 
IN THIS LAW SUIT. 
Appellant has made a big production out of a release 
signed hy respondant and his wife. It is set forth ver· 
batim on page 2 and 3 of the appellant's brief. But why? 
What does it have to do with this law suit? 
What does it mean to appellant to be released? What 
1s appellant's definition of release? Is a release an act 
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of forgiving? Or is it some magical document which 
changes facts? 
If a person has a car accident and injures someone 
needlessly and negligently, the injured party has a claim. 
If the tort feasor makes .an acceptable settlement with 
the injured party, the injured party releases him, in 
other words forgives him. In forgiving the tortfeasor, 
no-one claims that the accident didn't happen or that the 
injury wasn't sustained. One simply says that in spite 
of the facts of the accident and the injury, the injured 
party will make no further claim. 
A release is simply an act of forgiveness. 
Now if the tortfeasor who caused the injury also had 
a contractual duty to convey a piece of property to the 
injured party, and does in fact convey it on the same 
day he obtains a release, does the conveyance have anything 
to do with the tort? or the forgiveness of the claim for 
damages for the tort? or the antecedent duty to convey 
the property? Do such obvious principles have to be ex-
plained? 
One need only to read first the complaint .and then 
the release. The release releases the tortfeasors therein 
from "the alleged wrongful foreclosure or other grievence 
or cause of action or problem whatsoever in connection 
with the taking of title and forclosure procedure pro-
ceedings by (the tort f easors) etc." These things are 
torts. They fall under the conunon-law causes of action 
of malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and are 
torts. Nothing else. 
Now admittedly, there were other causes of action 
in case no. 174076. These other causes sought to enforce 
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Beneficial Life Insurance's agreement to reinstate the 
mortgage. An .action for specific performance is an action 
in equity. Actions for damages for torts are actions at law. 
Beneficial Life Insurance finally decided to perform 
its contractual duty and to reinstate the mortgage. A 
person never releases another person from per/ orming 
something that person has per/ ormed. When a duty is 
performed, there is nothing left to release. The per. 
formance ipso facto extinguishes the duty to perform, 
and extinguishes ipso facto the cause of action seeking 
to coerce the performance. 
Why do such simple concepts get so muddled up? 
POINT XIII. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
HAS NEVER MADE ANY ELECTIONS AT ALL 
IN THIS CASE, AND ELECTIONS MADE BY 
MR. GREENE, OR OTHER UNNAMED PERSONS 
INTERESTED IN BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY ARE NOT ACTS OF THE 
CORPORATION. 
All corporations are legal fictions. Beneficial Life In-
surance Co. is no exception. Corporations have no soul, 
no Id, no alter ego, no mind. Corporations can only act 
act through agents. These agents are styled directors. 
The overt acts of the agents .are recorded in the minutes 
of the directors meetings. 
The minutes of the directors meetings have been ex· 
amined and they show that this corporation has never 
ever done one overt thing with respect to the subject 
property. 
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Now admittedly, this authority can be delegated. But 
the delegation itself requires an overt act on the part of 
the delegator. The only overt act that can be found is 
m the by-laws, quotel earlier in this brief. 
But assmning the board of directors has done enough 
overt things to delegate some of the authority to some-
one named in the by-laws. The first thing that we must 
examine is the person to whom the authority is delegated. 
That person is the Chairman of the Board. Now if he 
is absent, the delegation falls to the vice chairmen. If 
they .are absent too, it falls to the President. 
But there is another problem. The delegation 1s 
limited. It gives the delegatee authority to preside at 
stockholder and director's meetings and to have the gen-
eral supervision of the ministerial affairs of the company. 
This doesn't say anything about forfeiting $30,000.00 
equities, or terminating contracts, or pursuing windfalls. 
Ministerial affairs are the little things that a corporation 
has to do to keep going. Now maybe the concept of big-
ness and littleness is a relative concept and maybe the 
pursuit of a $30,000.00 windfall is a little thing to appel· 
lant, hut judging this question by the energy the appelant 
has expended, it is a big thing to Beneficial Life Insur-
ance Company, too. 
But there is still another problem. The mantle of 
this delegated authority, whatever it is, falls upon the 
chairman of the hoard. Where is the evidence that he 
made an election? If he is absent, it falls upon the chair-
men, whoever they are. Where is the evidence that any 
of them made an election? If they are all .absent, to· 
gether with the cairman, it falls on the president. Where 
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is the evidence that he made an election? W11ere is the 
evidence the chairman was ever absent? 
More importantly, where is the evidence that any of 
them made any elections at the time (or times) and 
under the circumstances, and upon the conditiu•:. is they 
were entitled to make them? 
The record shows some confusing minutes of the ''home 
office committee" and "loan committee", but the minutes 
of the directors meetings and the by-laws don't even 
show that these committees, whatever they are, even 
exist. This part of the record can be disregarded as being 
informal socializing at the home office. 
POINT XIV. 
THE ADDENDUM TO THE CONTRACT AND 
THE PERFORMANCE OF MR. HARRISON 
THEREON DEFEATS THE FORFEITURE AND 
MAKES EVERY OTHER ISSUE MOOT. 
The addendum has already been set forth. The piv· 
otal words in the addendum ,are "at any time" The 
addendum clearly states that 16 (a) remedies shall not 
be available at any time after the judgment note has 
been paid. The payment and performance is not in dis· 
pule. It was performed by Mr. Harrison two days after 
the notice of October 21st, 1968 was served on respondant. 
If the English Language were a limited language and 
if simple concepts were difficult to express, one might 
be justified in reading implied restrictions into simple 
words. "Any" means "any" and not something else. Other 
adverbs are available if something other than "any" is 
meant. But instead of using alternate adverbs, people 
II d 'f " " P 1 " I . " usua y mo 1 y any. cop e can say a most any time 
so 
or can s.ay "any time up to " or "any time until", or "any 
time except". But the addendum doesn't say any of these 
things. It says simple "any time" Now what else can be 
said about something so simple. It means any time without 
any restrictions or limitations whatsoever. 
Judge Croft didn't need to decide that point. The 
appellant's case was too we.ak on other points. But if the 
Supreme Court should disagree with Judge Croft and 
not find the other points so fatally weak, it would seem 
that this issue alone would be dispositive of the case. 
What else can be said about a contract which has an 
addendum which takes away all forfeiture rights upon 
payment, which may be made at any time, and about a 
record which evidences undisputbly that the payment 
referred to therein was actually made? Is there really 
any other issue to decide? 
POINT XV. 
APPELLANT'S NOTICES WERE TOTALLY 
INSUFFICIENT. 
While this point should be fully expanded and ex-
plored, this brief has already approached its allowable 
length. What needs to be said about this point has 
already been said. On pages 191 through 197 of the 
principal record, there is a memorandum prepared and 
filed by respondant for Judge Croft. Pages 192 through 
195 address themselves to this point and appellant in-
corporates that argument herein by reference thereto. A 
flow chart explaining what steps may be taken by appel-
lant, in what sequence they must be taken, and when 
they may be taken is included in the appendix to this 
brief, which is prepared .and filed as a separate volume 
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because of the length. Point one of the argument on 
page 191 of the brief addressed to Judge Croft is not a 
valid point. Respondant should not have urged it, since 
respondant was clearly in error, but point two in that 
brief is very much in point and is incorporated herein 
by reference. Things must be <lone in their proper order, 
and the strict requirements of forfeiture must be metic-
ulously complied with if appellant expects to prevail. 
Appellant must w.ait until the contract is 30 days in 
default. This appellant did. 
At the end of that time, appellant may make some 
choices. Since there is no evidence of any overt corpor· 
ate action, it is questionable whether it made that choice, 
but assuming arguendo that it did, it must proceed either 
under A, or B, or under C, or elect to proceed at all. 
If it proceeds under A, it must serve a notice that 
the contract is in default, and demand that that default 
be be remedied within 5 days. That is all the notice is 
supposed to say. Appellant's notice goes further and 
advises respondant what it intends to do at the end of 
the 5 days. That is well and good, but it is surplusage, 
and can be disregarded. It might even invalidate the 
notice. After all, the appellant might change its mind 
within the 5 days and either decide to do nothing, or 
proceed to remedy B, or proceed to remedy C. 
At the end of the five days, if there has been no 
response to the demand, appellant may make a new 
choice. The s.ame doubt exists on the question of this 
choice as on the question of the earlier choice. 
If the corporation makes that choice, which it is 
only entitled to make if there is no response, then it 
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must serve notice of that election. It is not entitled to 
annc1pate the non-performance, or rely upon an earlier 
st:itement of what it, five <lays earlier, intended to do. 
At that point, the respondant, might be in unlawful 
detainer status, but since this never occured, there is 
no point in pursuing that any further. 
If the respondant were in unlawful detainer status, 
the statutory notices come into play, but that is all moot 
since the requisite notices up to that point were never 
giv(;n and since the performance by Mr. Harrison under 
the terms of the addendum short-stopped the play anyway. 
Appellant's comment on the alleged notice set forth 
on pages 12 and 13 of appellant's brief has no sig-
nificance. First of all, it is disputed that it was sent. 
hut procedurally, the notice is not proper subject matter 
for consideration, either at this level or at the trial court 
level. Now here in the pleadings is the notice mentioned. 
When both appellant and respondant filed motions for 
summary judgment, no mention was made by appellant 
of that notice. If it was to be an operative fact it should 
han been ple.aded in the complaint, or at least estab-
lished by affidavit attached to appellant's motion for 
summary judgement. 
This mysterious document makes its first appearance 
long after the motion for summary judgment were argued 
and after briefs were submitted. Mr. Greene, attached 
to his reply brief, .an affidavit which had attached to it 
the mysterious letter of May 27, 1968. This is far too 
late for any consideration at all, and should be disre-
garded, but even if it were not disregarded, it doesn't add 
anything or lend anything to appellant's case. 
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Its purport is to obtain the abatement of some weeds 
that were prevelant in the neighborhood during the time 
adjoining and adjacent lots (not belonging to either ap-
pellant or respondant) were vacant and frequently over-
grown with weeds. While it is denied that there was 
any significant growth of weeds, if there was, they were 
promptly cleared. The rest of the letter can simply be 
regarded as Mr. Greene's own interpretation of what the 
e.arlier notice accomplished, which of course is highly 
debatable, and which is one of the issues presented on 
this appeal. It certainly does not purport to be the new 
notice of the new election which appellant might have 
been able and entitled to make, but did not. 
POINT XVI. 
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ITS RIGHTS TO 
FOLLOW UP ITS NOTICES JANUARY 12, 1968. 
Judge Croft has said all that needs to be said about 
this, and appellant .adopts Judge Croft's argument on 
page 8 of his opinion which is to be found on page 215 
of the record as his own argument. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Croft, amazed at the contentions of appellant, 
expresses wonderment why plaintiff refused to accept 
a $7 ,000.00 tender and suggests that the plaintiff was 
more interested in the forfeiture than the other remedies. 
He perceptively observes that the existence of a very 
substantial equity in the property in favor of respondant 
suggests why. (See page 9 of the opinion at page 216). 
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His very astute comment sums up what this law suit 
is all about, and once the court has seen through ap· 
pellant's charade, everything else has an easy explanation. 
Legally, however, appellant's biggest area of miscom-
prehcnsion is in the contract provisions. Appellant has 
created two bins and tried to toss all of the cases into one 
bin or the other. Actually there are three bins. One 
is for self-executing contracts. There are two types of 
selJ-executing contracts. Forrester vs. Cook belongs in 
the the first bin. The rest of the cases, except the Van 
Zyverden case belong in the second bin. The Van Zy-
Yerden case and the Beneficial Contract belong in the 
i third bin. 
This, of course, is a classification in terms of the 
contract provisions. Should the contracts he considered 
in terms of other differences, the Beneficial-Respondant 
contract is in a class all by itself. What other forfeiture 
threatened a $30,000.00 equity, for instance? What other 
contract has an addendum? 
In spite of everything appellant urges, there is no 
theory upon which appellant can maintain a case, and 
. its case should die quietly .and gracefully in light of its 
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BRIEF 
Forrester vs Cook 
(77 u 137, 292 p 201'-, 1930) 
Facts: On May 19, 1924 Diana Forrester, as seller and Harry F. Cook 
and a Mr. Noyes, as buyers, entered into a contract under the terms of which 
the seller agreed to sell and the buyer agreed to buy the Ivy Apartment in ' 
Salt Lake City, Utah. The purchase price was $17, 100. 00. The buyer was 
given $3, 000. 00 credit for the pre -existing mortgage on the premises, 
which the buyer agreed to assume and The buyer was also given 
$2, 420. ll credit for equities in two pieces of undescribed real estate 
transferred from the buyer to the seller. The deferred balance of $11, 579. 89 
was payable in quarterly installments of $3 00. 00. 
The contract contained this self-executing provision: 
"In the event of a failure to make any payment when the same shall 
become due or within 60 days thereafter, the seller shall be released 
from all obligations in law and equity to convey said property, and 
buyer shall forfeit as liquidated damages all payments which have 
heretofore been made on this contract. .•• the buyer becoming at 
once a tenant at will of the seller. 11 
All quarterly payments (of $300. 00) were made untii November, 
192 7 (apparently 13 of them). After one extension from its original undis -
closed due date, the Walker Bank mortgage became finally due on October 11, 
1927 and was not paid. Disputes arose over irrelevant matters and seller 
on January 28, 1928 served on the buyer a notice in this words: 
"You and each of you will further take notice that by reason of 
your failure to make the payments hereinbefore referred to, 
you· and each of you under the terms of said aereement have become 
and now are and are hereby declared to be the tenants at will of 
Diana Forrester; and as such you and each of you are hereby required 
to vacate the property .••• and surrender possession thereof to 
said Diana Forrester within five days from the date of the service 
of this notice upon you. 11 
The buyer failed to comply with the notice and on January 21, 1928 (?) 
(the date seems to be in error) the seller commenced an unlawful detainer-
action. Prior to trial, the buyer disclaimed any interest in the property, 
and tendered pos se_s sion to seller. 
The question went to trial on the issue of damages and attorney fees. 
The trial court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an attorney 
fe;el and, ultfr.c,atdy, that damages of $9i0. 00, which enc court re:iused to 
treble, should be· allowed. The court struck buyer's counterclaim. 
Both buyer and seller appealed. The Supreme Court held: 
(1) No attorney fees will be allowed in an unlawful detainer action 
where it does not purport to enforce, but rather to avoid the agreement. 
(2) A counterclaim in an unlawful detainer action cannot be filed. 
_ (3) There was no. competent evidence {in the record) on which to base 
darnages. 
The court remanded for a retrial, but gave son")e helpful dictum. In 
ex?,minin;; the ·vo:cdir.g of this particular co:'.ltr::!.c:t, cou:-t observed 
the agreement ipso facto and automatically made the bc.yer tenants at will 
of the seller upon failure to comply with the terms of the conti·act, {and other 
dictum not helpful here.) 
BRIEF 
Leone vs Zuniga 
(84Utah417, 34P2d G'7'J, 1934} 
Facts: On an undisclosed date (presumably in 1926) Leone as seller 
and Zuniga as buyer, entered into a contract under the terms of which the , 
seller agreed to sell and buyer agreed to buy undisclosed property in Salt 
Lake County for the agreed consideration of $6, 900. 00. The buyer was 
credited $1, 750. 00 down payment by reason for a conveyance to seller of 
other property. The balance of $5, 150. 00 was to be paid in monthly install-
ments of $45. 00 beginning March 20, 1926. 
The contract contained this language: 
"In the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by 
buyer or upon failure to make any payments when the same shall 
become due, or within 60 days thereafter, the seller shall, at 
his option, be released from all obligations in law and equity to 
convey said property and the buyer shall forfeit as liquidated 
damages, all payments which have been made . • the buyer 
becoming at once a tenant at will of the seller. 11 
No notices were served. 
The evidence showed, without that the Zunigas were in 
default. The trial court ruled that the contract was cancelled and forfeited 
and that the seller was entitled to $250. 00 attorney fees. 
The buyer, on appeal, alleged that it was necessary for the seller 
to allege and prove notice of forfeiture. (Other error, not ;relevant here, 
was also a?signed.) 
The Supreme Court, in ruling on this issue, distinguished be tween 
self-executing and non- self:...executing type contracts. It held that notice 
is a pre-requisite when the terms are not self-executing and that it maI 
not be a pre-requisite when the terms are self-executing. It cited 
Bergman vs. Lewis (68 U 178, 249 P 470) as an example of a contract where 
the contract was self-executing and notice was not necessary, and Howorth 
vs. Mills (62 Utah 574, 221P165) where it was not self-executing and notice 
was required. 
The Supreme Court found the Leone-Zuniga_contract unlike Bergman 
vs. Lewis and like Howorth vs. Mills. 
2634 
Rationaie: ln non-self-executing contracts, the seller merely gains 
the right to make elections u'pon the buyer's default. He may elect to stand 
upon his right to declare a forfeiture, or may elect to waive the forfeitur·e 
and elect to enforce the contract to its terms. The object of the 
language is to give the vendor an election. If he wants to avail himself 
of his right to avoid the contract, he must make an unequivocal election 
evidencing that intention. A contrary rule would place the buyer in a 
dilemma. If he vacates the premises, he may be confronted with an action 
to enforce the contract. If he fails to vacate, he may be n:et with a suit for 
possession. 
Held; Reversed and with instructions to sustain the buyer's demurrer. 
Since the contract was not self- executing a notice was required and since it 
was not given and not alleged, the complaint failecl to state a cause of action. 
BRIEF 
vs Guild 
(101 Utah 313, 121 P 2d 401 1942) 
On an undisclosed date in 1935, John Christy etux as seller, and 
Edward L. Guild etux as buyer, entered into an agreement according to 
the terms of which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to 
buy property in Salt Lake County for $3, 200. 00. The buyer paid nothing 
down and undertook to pay the entire purchase price in deferred monthly 
installments of $20. 00 for six months, then $25. 00 for the next six months, 
then $30. 00 per month until the entire balance was paid. 
The contract provided that upon the buyer's default, the seller might 
elect to terminate the contract and retain the payments made as liquidated 
damages, the buyer becoming a tenant at will of the seller. 
On April 30, 1940, the installments were $130. 00 in arrears and the 
sellers served notice on the buyers (paraphrased) as follows: 
Unless the arrear_s of $130. 00 are brought 'current, the 
improvements are made to the property and the taxes and 
insurance of $297. 20 are paid before May 12, 1940, the 
contract would be terminated, and the payments rnade would 
be retained as liquidated damages and the buyers would be 
a tenant at will of the sellers. 
On May 15, 1940, a notice to quit was served on buyers. 
The buyers failed to comply with the notice to quit. The sellers sued 
for restitution of the premises and for damages. Before institution of the 
suit, the buyer tendered $130. 00 but did not tender payment of the $297. 20 
taxes and insurance and did ·not make the agreed improvements. 
The buyer did not raise any of_ the usual questions on appeal, such 
as the sufficiency of the notice. The buyer simply questioned (1) whether 
the question of default should have been submitted to the jury and (2) 
whether in light of the equities, reimbursement should not be made for 
the improvements made and the large amount paid (1/ 3 of the principal) 
(plus interest) on the contract. 
The court held on the first point. {l) That the lower court did not 
err in directing a verdict, since there was no dispute on the question of a 
default. 
The oourt held on the second point (2j that che propercy had produced 
$75. 00 per month income which over a period of five years and had more 
than reimbursed the seller, not only for his monthly installments, but 
$2 I 000. 00 in imprOVem entS and that the forfeiture Of the monthly payments 
was not, on the facts of this case, a penalty. 
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BRIEF 
Pacific Development vs. SLewa.rl 
(ll3 Utah 403., 195 P 2d 748 1948) 
5. 
On an undisclosed date, Pacific Development, as seller, entered into 
a contract with J. P .. Stewart etux, as buyers, according to the terms of 
which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to buy property 
in Provo, Utah for $5, 900. 00. The buyer paid $100. 00 down and uncle rtook 
to discharge the deferred balance of $5, 800. 00 in monthly installments 
of $55. 00 . 
The contract contained the following fanguage: 
"Ln the event of a failure to comply with the terms hereof by the 
buyer, or upon the failure to make any payments when the same 
shall become due or within 20 days thereafter the seller shall 
at his option be released from all obligations in law and equity 
to convey said property • • the buyer coming at once a 
tenant of the seller. 11 
After multiple defaults there was an arrearage· of $557. 50 on 
October 24, 1946. On that date the seller gave notice that unless the 
arrearage was paid in full within seven days, the seller (would) elects 
to declare the entire contract forfeited. 
On November 12, 1946, a notice to quit was served. 
the defendants were given an additional five days in which 
due obligation. They were unable to do so (and did not do 
By that notice 
to pay the past 
so). 
The trial court held that the 23 day notice was unreasonable. 
The Supreme Court held that 23 days was a reasonable time, and 
since up until the time of trial they had not cured the default and the buyers 
had not paid the equivalent of the rental value of the property ($55. 00 per 
month) for the time they had occupied the property, and since .there was 
doubt as to whether the buyer could have cured the default even if given 
additional time, a forfeiture should be allowed and a writ of possession 
should be issued. 
BRIEF 
Fuhriman vs Bissegger 
(13 Utah 2d 379, 375 P 2d 27, 1952) 
On an undisclosed date in 1946, Festus Fuhriman, as seller, entered 
into a contract with Alfred Bissegger and LaRene Bissegger as buyers 
according to the terms of which the seller agreed to sell and the buyers 
agreed to buy for an undisclosed price. No down payment is mentioned 
and no monthly payments are set forth, although it is intimated that the 
payments were to be $10. 00 per month. 
The contract provided that if the buyer failed to make the payments 
as they came due, the seller, at his option,. could forfeit the buyers' 
rights to take possession of the property. 
The seller let the buyer remain in possession almost 14 years with 
virtually no payments. 
The seller served no notice of his election and in 1960 commenced 
a suit for possession. 
The buyer counterclaimed for specific performance. The trial 
court granted specific performance provided all amounts -due under the 
contract were deposited within 60 days. 
The Supreme Court held that since there were no notices, there 
was no forfeiture and the counterclaim for specific performance should 
be granted. 
f" F r• . ...,_ <• 
BRIEF 
Jacobsen vs. Swan 
(3 Utah 2d 278 P 2d 294 1954) 
(. 
The opinion says that on or about June 27, 1947 (which appears to be 
erroneous) a Mr. Neilson offered property in Orem, Utah for sale through' 
Dixon Real Estate for $14, 000. 00. A salesman for the company found a 
willing buyer who had a $4, 000. 00 down payment. Since the down payment was 
inadequate to satisfy Mr. Neilson, the salesman, Emil Jacobsen, advanced 
$10, 000. 00 and combining it with $4, 000. 00 received from the prospective 
purchasers {the Swans) paid Mr. Neilson cash for the property. 
The new title owner (the Jacobsens) then, as seller, entered into 
ari agreement with the Swans, as buyers, according to the terms of which 
the sellers agreed to sell the subject property for $14, 000. 00. The buyers 
paid $4, 000. 00 down and agreed to pay the deferred balance of $10, 000. 00 
in monthly installments of $80. 00. 
The contract provided that in case of buyer's default, the sellers 
at their option would be released from all obligations to convey the property, 
that all payments made would be forfeited as liquidated and the 
buyers would be come tenants at will of the sellers. 
On March ll, 1947, the buyers were in default, and after notices the 
original agreement was superseded by a· lease agreement under the terms of 
which the buyers became the lessee of the seller who became lessors. 
One Hundred Dollars per month was to be paid, $80. 00 of which would be 
"rent" and $20. 00 of which would be credited to the accrued arrearage of 
$889. 41 under the contract. If the buyers did not default on the lease, the 
parties agreed to revert to the original agreement. 
On June 27, 1950 still another lease was entered into, superseding 
the lease of March 11, 194 7. The lessees were to pay $3 00. 00 on or before 
August 31, 1950. This $300. 00 was paid, but on March 5, 1952 the lessees 
were in default again. 
On March 5, 1952, lessor served lessees with unconditional notice 
to quit, requiring the defendants to quit the premises by March 31, 1952. 
Nothing happened. On August 12, 1952 a similar notice to quit was served 
requring the lessee to quit the premises by September 15, 1952. 
The lessors sued in unlawful detainer. The trial court awarded 
possession of the property to the lessor, but required the lessor to 
account for the sums paid under the original contract but not under the 
two subsequent lease agreements. The trial court found that the pay1nents 
on the original contract was $3, 190. 00 more than the rental value of the 
property. 
The Supreme Court held that under the original contract the lessees 
were entitled to a credit of $3, 190. 00; under the first lease the lessees were 
entitled to a credit of $480. 00 and under the second lease agreement the 
lessor was entitled to $1, 246. 62 plus $600. 00 for the lessee's hold-over, 
giving the Swans a net judgment of $1, 823. 38. 
BRIEF 
Van Zyverden vs Farrar 
(15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P 2d 4681964) 
On an undisclosed date, presumably in 1960, the Farrars, as sellers, 
entered into an agreement with the Van Zyverdens, as buyers, according to 
the terms of which the sellers agreed to sell and the buyers agreed to buy 
certain property known as the Daniels Creek Ranch for an undisclosed 
price and on undisclosed terms. 
The contract provided that for buyer's failure to make payments 
when due, the at his option, would have certain alternative remedies 
including: 
"* * Upon failure of the buyer to remedy the default within five 
days. after written notice, to be released from all obligations and 
forfeit all payments as liquidated damages, the buyer becoming 
at once a tenant at the will of the seller.* *" 
' 
In November, 1961, the Farrars assigned their interest to Seagull 
Investment Co. On November 15, 1961 Seagull made demand on the buyers 
for the first annual payment. Seagull gave notice on January 3, 1961 to ' 
the buyers to remedy the default in five days or quit the premises. On 
January 16, 1962, Seagull brought an action for 
. -
On February 10, 1969, Seagull caused another 
1
similar notice to be 
served. On :february 13, 1962, Seagull filed a in an earlier 
• I ' 
action brought by the Van Zyverdens ,against them.· 
Without making any comment on the notice of January 3,, 1961 and the 
ac;tion commenced on January 16, 1962 based there upon# the· court held 
that the notice of February 10, 1962 was inadequate because it was 
• f 
served after the action had been commenced. 
I \ 
The Supreme Court held .this to be a contest, saying that whether 




UNIFORM REAL CONTRACT 
(e.Ct . . \ 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made in duplicate this 15th. dayho{ S el_)tf'emb_e_r ___ , A. D., 19_6_0_, 
Ralph W.Farrar and Helen R. r'arrar, is WJ. e by and between :_::_:_=-:.:_::_:_ _ ___:. __________________ --"--------:---'-'----------
\±- . I I 
hereinafter designated as the Seller, andL_e_Q__.Ya,n Zyverden and Sytske van Zyverden' 
as 'oint tenants and not as tenants in common with full ri ht of' vo 
. . t:>alt Lake City ta P hereinafter designated as the 
2 .. WITNESS ETH: That the Seller, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buye.r, 
and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property, situate m 
the county of ____¥lasatch , State of Utah, City Utah R • .it'. D. Box #140. 
. . 'ihe Southeast Quarter of' the Quarter of' 
More particularly described as follows: s· t. 7 'l' h. 4 '-' th .... 5 Ea t <.!alt ec ion , owns 1p uOU , uange S , w 
Lake Meridiano 
Also, Beginning at the Southeast Corner of the Northeast Quarter of Sec-
tion 21, Township 4 South, Range 5 East, 'Salt Lake Meridian, thence West 
6 chains, thence North 25 chains, thence East 6 chains, thence South 
25 chains to the beginning. . 
Also, The Northwest Quarter and the Northeast Quarter.of the Southwest 
Quarter of' Section 22, Township 4 South, !!ange5 East, ::>alt Lake Meridi 
See Attached Rider hereto. 
3. Said hereby agrees to enter into pos.scssion and pay for said described premises the sum of $60 1 000-.--
Sixty thousand - ------------ --:..-------------------Dollars($ 60 ,ooo.- ) 
payable at the office of Seller, his assigns or order in Ogden ·Utah · O 
five 500 .-strictly within the following times, to-wit: - . · ($-------
cash, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and the balance of $ 5 5 '000 • - shall be paid as follows: 
$2750.- or more, plus interest of 6% per annum on or before Nov.lst.1961 
and $2750.- or more plus 6% interest per annum ·.on the .unpaid balance, 
every November 1st. each year thereafter untill paid in f\111. 
-, 
.) ' .-f. if;"' , 
Possession of said premises shall be delivered to buyer on the day of September , 19 60 •. 
4. Said monthly payments are to be applied first 'tio 'CJS()terest and second to the reduction of the 
principal. Interest shall be charged from 0 eptem er ,/)v:r c.j; a on all unpaid portions of the 
purchase price at the rate of 6 per cent ( 6 !" % ) per annurfi. The Buyer, at his option at anytime, 
may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
or contract by the Buyer herein assumed, such excess to be applied either to unpaid principa1 or in prepayment of future 
installments at the election of the buyer, which election must be made at the time the excess payment is made. · 
5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment froin the Buyer on this contract less than according 
to the terms herein mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter the terms of the contract as to the forfeiture 
hereinafter stipulated, or as to any other remedies of the seller. · 
6. It is understood that there presently exists an obligatldn property in favor of M.R.i•1lchelsen . .ls(/" with an unpaid balance of 
$ 22 ,ooo - , as of s eptemeb_er ___ th.1960 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district taxes covering improvements to said prem-
ises now in the process of being installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said pr_op-
erty, except the following 
8. The Seller is given the option to secure, execute and main_tain Joans secured by said 5rope,rty of not to exceed the 
then unpaid contract balance hereunder, bearing interest at the rate of not to exceed OI 6 percent 
( % ) per annum and payable in regular installments; provided that the installment 
payments required to be made by Seller on said loaiis shall not be greater than each installment payment required to be 
made by the Buyer under this contract. \Vhen the principal due hereunder has been reduced to the amount of any such 
loans and mortgages the Seller agrees to convey and the Buyer agrees to accept title to the above described property 
subject to said loans and mortgages. 
9. If the Buyer desires to exercise his right through accelerated payments under this agreement to pay off any obli-
gations outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, it shall be the Buyer's obligation to assume and 
pay any penalty which may be required on prepayment of said prior obligations. Prepayment penalties in respect 
to obligations against said property incurred by seller, after date of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless 
said obligations are assumed or approved by buyer. 
10. The Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan of such 
amount as can be secured under the regulations of said !ender an:.! hereby ::;;c:c' t.o c,pply any amount so received upon 
the purchase price above mentioned, and to execute the papers required and Llay 0ne-:._1: the expenses necessary in ob-
taining said loan, the Seller z.gr.::eing to pay the other one:-haH, P<vVit:L..; !ichnc'nci, ,;,,,.t the monfoly payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and inteN>st r:ite as outlined above. 
1 L 'The Buyer agrees to pay all taxes and assessments of every kind and n:il.ure which arc or which may be assessed 
and which may become due on these premises during the life of this agreement. The Seller herd>y covenants and agrees 
that there are no assessments against said premises except the following: 
(: ... "/':- i :· . 
. 71,J J c;---.: /r _ _,, .. J -
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ocntract th&\ 1t b mpt, s.m 1n good cmulltliCil. 12 
.. 
Vo horobf «1-m yon thia nottcs ot fit c=tmot dzlt"4 this 







CL!3 folktl'D J 
th6 (fa2rtor {>./ af 
7, 4 5 &&&t, "til.lt 
J.lsv, et th'3 iutt C' ... , r/f'. tho 'f'YM"'.:h'lt'iP.•;'. 
t1f 21, 
Sv.li! Co ehr.iw: r Herth 
cb.1t.{ t.hcn>:<t t1".t:t1! f> fUJ, &.i:;ath 'J 5 chrl.in.11 
1\1 i".J, The tvdu ... tm· t},v; .. 
or n I 4 &<,;11''.;.h J :?.!2.tJ;;7,i 
Jri...;t, l-1;1<0 , 
.6.J C't:u1!.l';,;, t},.q, 
Coil"a-:- of Zi, .. j:> :.,;..."tth, 
t. 'li'a•,t• 'f;, 1 '' ,. .. 1 • ., .lj :.1• t!.-.,..,r'V",,.. ;: .... ,, .. •, \t,.ll., ...... in-.,., "J '-'"';.n;.,,,_ ."""' .... J..\.-1 ,'D.''> 1;vt-«'..,.,, ..... • ... --""3:.- 1 .... ...-., 
?\l,,rth J.'i'-' ?r . .'.5 ittJl'l 1 .. 41 
f.llr ta th;} ci.f 
'h".1Ci9ti"!ot> :, H •.l"c.tqr :to 1 
Cfl" ooo-.;i :h\'¢1':•:.-:.:·t:r.:."'d .. •.,n rltLi ·11=.-- in 
!'ilny t.(I th0 nbm·.:t Jti!.i'-·· · 
tj_c1;.ll!.1'?t trrt;; 'uJt 1..'::.ii:l1m:iYtJ..l:r, tt0·-11:lt4 i;;rn.s 
1.1t-,[}i'l;J1 •1.'t Cn1)Ht1J S"'od.: G-f Ccq.rfi<,n 
o·I' tho Stoo'!I: <d 
1 r./! tJ1cr1 &t{r,':k '<Jf 
• . 
.i.l:sa fF1• iU"lii 12 
7 r 1 3. :r, 1 l 
2 V./Jf:,c1hft, 1 1 l l-$ri.:; 3.ev1.11 '.:r, 
! SO !&al.J .. ;m \:;.•.nk, l S•1 .... vi.t"li rt:lin-
3:1,rh.«k·:.'11f:.&;d.9, 1 (D.:.h·y XJn.d ..f.65 lba. 
Fit;hlQ.l'<G 'C.-d-:y -
i 
HliVJ &r-;.d t\ heevc:;f r..-· tt'.J. )'X:l't,<,;. 1 





J. .. 11..: ]:;.Y.1 .. 
.. I ·- . I ,,, 
i.-1. 
-J.JlC, •. 1 9 
-:;1:,' l·-'i$9l J.-"!. 28 
.. '-·· V3 
t: 
·· C 











n .. n· 




U J'.Ot l'Jq(! tm'J m-c.."lMJic·t t 
tiled or '4N to hiJ on said in cf 
, 
l:W 3l':;.i.¢1 I1n•.,;:Jl!-
';hc..i: i:n "l'!'t"'·''t. tl'i::.t y(:.""-'9. , ... u llJ1 ;nno 
' . 
, 
in s...n1 tc '3 11r.d 
... f'o':"'" lf'fic'1:.).o.n 9'41.d )'l"'Q.4.'is>o5:, 




I.Aka Cit"Y, . 
'.:830 3535 South 




on or about the 3rd day of 19G2 Seagull 
15. 
Iavestr.tent Cor '3.1iU1y did cu.use to be served you a docwnent entitled 
"ifot.;_ce of Ternination of Contr2.ct c:.nd Five day Notice .·to Vacate Prer:d.ses 11 , 
a of w:ueh is hereto as exhibit 11A11 2.nd mc:de a part hereof 
reference thereto fully as if all of the terms thereof ,.,ere spelled 
out herein.in detail, and 
• ',/l{S={E.'..S, you fo.ilcd to cor,:rily with s<d d c.nd to your 
default under tllc ten1s of the contract tllCreto and h;:i_ve f;iilecl, 
neglected ;.:_nd refused to v:acate and surrender s<:dd premises. 
HO'! Ti.::E:EFOJ.'3, you &.re hereby notified that if for 2.ny re.:::.son 
the to ten:'inate your occupancy of the preL:ises &tmcxed hereto &s 
2.s aforesaid \vci.S for any reason ineffecti_ve, that you arc 
not:i_ficd th.::.t you rnust vacate said 9r'eidses uit;hin five (5) days 
<dtcr service of ti1is notice ui)on you and that if you fail 'so to do, th2t 
;'0!1 ,,,ill t:1crcaftcr be guilty of tmlawful det<..iner of said nre;-:ises in 
1953 
<.ccorcLncc '.·:itl1 the )revisions of 78-36-3(2)/and related st<.tntcs and t:12.t 
you \rill be 15able for three t51nes the dc..n;ages assessed in 2.ccord2.ncc u:i th 
j 
the of 78-36-10, UC/ .. , 1953 and related statu.tes; ti1<..t this notice 
in no affect the existing legal proceedings now :-icndin['; conccri1in:-; 
l1e1 ..;::_11 111c11t5_oncd. 
..,:-r' 
C. for s·c.:c'=ull Invcst-
it1cnt Co11"!any, :->r,70 Soiith State Street, 
Lz .. L:c C:i ty, Ut<c·.11 
:;.-",;? :,"fo .. d !/. .. ?.{_ .. 







i .A'.\ J 
.· 
t.i¥80R'.3EO "P·;)l'I 2,1'-· I u I ED) , 
nsn--·t.:L.:,. [lAi"t. 8Al0 ec:r;-:;.:.:t-:;_1.00l1'JG M':; LND O\T;C:J<-' .. i\'{1..£. 
'.) •\ ... t.: D ,. '// ') ' , s /. :.. ,, LA i< t. 
... 
/ 





R. E. ,1.Vr:: /. ·'En' '. --_-----------












SIVE /{OT/CE OFELEcf/OI{ 
To 8£ RELEASED F.RoM 
OBLIGATION ro COll//EY 
FORFEIT PAYkfENT.S AS P4MM£S 
8VYERNOWj 
12 IN VNLAW/:CIL 
DETAINER 
STAT'/S 
GIVE 5" .OAY 
13 NOT/CC 
ro Qv1r 
